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Abstract
We provide a new measure of sovereign country risk exposure (SCRE)
to global sovereign tail risk based on information incorporated in 5-year
sovereign CDS spreads. Our panel regressions with quarterly data from 53
countries show that macro risks have strong explanatory power for SCRE.
Results show that SCRE increases for countries with less fiscal space, higher
interest rates, and financial stability concerns. Exposure sensitivity to pub-
lic sector leverage is shown to increase non-linearly with public debt and
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to decrease with central banks’ sovereign debt programs. Our results im-
ply that good forward-looking macro-finance fundamentals, such as high ex-
pected GDP growth and low credit-to-GDP ratios protect countries against
sovereign risk especially in times of global distress.
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We provide a new measure of sovereign country risk exposure (SCRE) to global
sovereign tail risk based on information incorporated in 5-year sovereign CDS spreads.
Our panel regressions with quarterly data from 53 countries show that macro risks have
strong explanatory power for SCRE. Results show that SCRE increases for countries
with less fiscal space, higher interest rates, and financial stability concerns. Exposure
sensitivity to public sector leverage is shown to increase non-linearly with public debt
and to decrease with central banks’ sovereign debt programs. Our results imply that
good forward-looking macro-finance fundamentals, such as high expected GDP growth
and low credit-to-GDP ratios protect countries against sovereign risk especially in times
of global distress.
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1 Introduction
In times of global financial turmoil some sovereigns appear more vulnerable than others.
Indeed, while investors seem to be reluctant to invest in certain national government bond
markets, they can be eager to invest their savings in safe sovereign assets yielding almost
zero interest rates. Understanding the key drivers of exposure to global sovereign distress
is of utmost important for both monetary and fiscal authorities to inform policy shifts,
as well as private investors to support portfolio allocation decisions. In this context,
this paper tries to answer a very specific question: What macro-financial fundamentals
make investors distrust some countries more than others in times of global sovereign debt
crises?
The paper’s first contribution is to derive a new measure of country-sovereign debt
exposure to global-sovereign debt distress. This measure is obtained as the average of
the country’s 5-year sovereign debt credit default swap (CDS) spread associated with the
worst realizations of global sovereign risk during each quarter at alternative significance
levels. Global sovereign risk is in turn computed as the implied time-varying GDP-
weighted average of 53 countries sovereign CDS spreads. Our measure is inspired in
the methodology developed by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2016) in
the banking literature, in which banks’ exposure to systemic risk is explained in terms
of balance sheet determinants. Analogously, we control for the externalities of large
countries on sovereign markets in the construction of our global risk measure in order to
capture the exposure of country risk to global tail risk. A key contribution of the paper
is to explain what macro-financial factors make such exposure more severe in a panel
data setting.
Our results show that strong expected macro fundamentals decisively insulate coun-
tries from global sovereign risk. We find that countries with lower expected GDP growth,
higher interest rates, and excessive credit growth are significantly more exposed to global
risk. In contrast, sound monetary and fiscal policies are both key in reducing exposure:
High fiscal space -lower debt to GDP ratio- and adequate monetary/financial policy
stance prevent exposure against global sovereign risk. Overall, our empirical results
present two novel insights with respect to the previous literature: First, forward-looking
variables, such as expectations of GDP growth, the monetary policy stance and the
credit-to-GDP ratio emerge as relevant drivers of sovereign exposure to global sovereign
tail risk. Second, exposure to government leverage is clearly non-linear, as illustrated by
our analysis. In particular, the relation between exposure and public debt is positive and
non-linear with regard to the level of public debt. It also depends on policy messages and
actions taken by monetary policy authorities to support specific sovereign debt markets.
We show that these results are independent of the confidence level set for the global tail
risk dependence measure (i.e. 1, 5 or 10%).
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Recent literature also uses CDS spreads as a measure of sovereign credit risk.1 In
their regressions, Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) emphasize the key role
of international factors in explaining credit risk differentials. While we also control for
global factors, we find that local macro-financial variables are important in explaining
these differentials. The focus of our study is also quite different. First, we construct
a measure of country-sovereign exposure to global sovereign tail risk. In a second step,
we identify what macro-financial factors directly influence such exposure. This novel
approach to explain the factors behind global-to-local interdependence differentiates our
analysis from that of Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013). We also focus on a larger
set of variables and perform a number of policy exercises showing non-linear effects of
debt-to-GDP based on both its level and interactions with the monetary policy measures
taken to support sovereign debt markets.
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) carry out an analysis of sovereign risk during the recent
crisis and conclude that poor fundamentals contributed to higher CDS spreads and yields
during the recent financial crisis. Several important aspects differentiate our study from
theirs. First, while they directly examine the impact of fundamentals on CDS spreads,
we identify the impact of fundamentals on a novel measure of sovereign exposure to
global tail risk. Second, we study a much larger set of explanatory drivers in order to
draw policy recommendations. Some of the new indicators included in our analysis turn
out to be crucial in driving sovereign market exposure, such as expectations of future
macro variables, alternative debt thresholds and financial stability variables (loose/tight
monetary policy, credit-to-GDP ratio). Third, our results capture the positive externality
of accommodative post-July-2012 monetary policy by the ECB, which helped not only to
compress sovereign spreads but to reduce the exposure sensitivity of Eurozone peripheral
countries to government indebtedness.
There are other papers focused on disentangling idiosyncratic and common compo-
nents in financial contagion episodes. Ang and Longstaff (2013) and Broto and Perez-
Quiro´s (2015) estimate the exposure of US states and European Monetary Union coun-
tries to the systemic component of sovereign credit risk. Our results implicitly support
some of their findings, as they also find that some countries suffer more than others in
times of global turbulence. Our methodologies and analysis are however considerably
different on many dimensions. The most important difference across studies is that they
do not explain tail-risk exposure in terms of specific macro-financial fundamentals, as we
do.
Another strand of the contagion literature focuses on correlations across alternative
financial markets, distinguishing between quiet and turbulent times (see King and Wad-
hwani (1990), Longin and Solnik (2001) and Caporin, Pelizzon, Ravazzolo, and Rigobon
(2013), among others). In contrast to these studies, we extract exposure measures based
1Earlier work focused instead on sovereign yield spreads across countries. Some examples are Edwards
(1984), Edwards (1986), Berg and Sachs (1988), Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003).
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on the CDS performance associated with global tail risk. In this way, we explicitly ac-
count for the impact of global distress on the home market and, at a later stage, relate
exposure to macro-finance fundamentals. Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) develop the
co-excedence measure, which captures coincidences in tail stock returns across markets.
Based on this measure, they run multinomial logits of actual coincidences on regional
volatilities, interest rates and exchange rates. In our approach we also focus on contem-
poraneous interactions, rather than on dynamic domino effects or international spillovers
happening over time. However, there are some important differences in terms of markets
(stocks v/s sovereign debt), sample (pre-2000 v/s post-2000) and econometric framework,
among others. The two metrics of exposure are also quite different, since they count co-
incidences in two-sided tail returns while we capture CDS sovereign debt market spreads
associated with global downside tail risk. Finally, our set of exposure macro-financial
drivers is substantially larger, allowing us to provide richer policy implications.
Our results resonate well with the flight-to-quality international finance literature.
Theoretical and empirical work has provided a good characterization of flight-to-quality
events in the wake of financial crisis episodes (see Calvo (2005), Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2008), Krishnamurthy (2010) and Baele, Bekaert, Inghelbrecht, and Wei (2013),
among others). The focus of our study is however to explain why some countries end up
being more exposed than others. While our results are associated with the years around
the recent 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath, this key event provides a very relevant
episode to study the macro-financial drivers of portfolio flows to sovereign debt markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop a measure of global sovereign
debt distress and the associated exposure by country. Section 3 discusses our data se-
lection whereas Section 4 derives our econometric methodology in order to identify the
country exposure to global sovereign risk. Section 5 shows the empirical results, and per-
forms a battery of policy and robustness exercises. Section 6 derives policy implications
and concludes.
2 A Measure of Exposure to Global Sovereign Debt
Distress
This section proceeds in two parts. The first one develops a measure of global-sovereign
risk while the second one derives a metric capturing the exposure of country-sovereign risk
to global sovereign risk. We now explain in detail how we construct these two measures.
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2.1 A Global Sovereign Debt Default Risk Index
In this paper, we use 5-year sovereign CDS spreads as a measure of sovereign risk. These
CDS spreads are mid-market indicative prices for five-year CDS contracts. The CDS
spread is the insurance premium for protection against default. At origination, this
premium is set such that the CDS has a value of zero. During the life of the contract,
when the credit risk of the underlying asset increases, CDS premiums tend to increase,
thus hindering supply and demand in actual sovereign debt markets. CDS pricing also
feeds into rating models and thus into both the issuance cost of sovereign debt and the
willingness of market participants to hold sovereign paper (see Fitch (2007) and Rubia,
Sanchis-Marco and Serrano (2016)).
The use of CDS spreads in our setting enhances the statistical power of the analysis
because there are instances where a sovereign crisis could happen but does not. Thus
CDS spreads capture the risk of a crisis even if the default event does not materialize.
As a result, it gets around the small sample problem present in studies which only study
actual crises. While CDS spreads are both a measure of probability of default and loss
given default (Singh and Bilal (2012)), both dimensions translate into higher default-
based expected losses for the investor. Finally, as in Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak
(2013) and other studies, we measure CDS spreads in levels, which are comparable across
countries and times. They are based on 5-year term contracts, since this is the most
traded CDS in practice.
Due to data availability, the early literature –dating back to the 80s–, measured
sovereign risk as the spread on sovereign long-term bonds. This spread is simply the
difference between the long-term sovereign interest rate of a given country and the ana-
log sovereign rate of a reference country with no default risk. The recent literature has
emphasized the advantages of using CDS spreads instead whenever researchers are fo-
cused on default risk. As pointed out by Ang and Longstaff (2013), CDS spreads allow
researchers to capture default risk more directly due to their very nature –they pay back
to the buyer the face value of the debt contract in case of debt default–, thus abstract-
ing from alternative macroeconomic risks (see Abbritti, Gil-Alana, Lovcha, and Moreno
(2016) for an analysis of these alternative risks).
Our analysis focuses on the exposure of country-sovereign default risk to global-
sovereign tail events. We thus take a global-to-local approach. Several recent papers have
analyzed the global-to-local direction in debt markets and concluded that global shocks
affect countries’ sovereign debt markets (Csonto and Ivaschenko (2013), Arslanalp and
Tsuda (2014) and Ebeke and Kyobe (2015)). In our analysis we are interested in identi-
fying the factors driving the sensitivity of local sovereign default risk to situations where
global sovereign markets are in distress. This framework gives policy makers valuable in-
formation to manage macro-financial risks and adopt policies to insulate their economies,
at least partially, to future global turmoil.
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In order to describe our empirical methodology, we first introduce a general real
GDP-weighted measure of daily global sovereign risk based on the CDS spreads of all
countries:
GSRIt =
(
N∑
i=1
GDPi,t
)−1 N∑
i=1
GDPi,t × CDSi,t, (1)
where N is the total number of countries used in the construction of the index, GDPi,t and
CDSi,t are the real GDP and the CDS spread of the i-th country on day t, respectively.
Our sample includes N=53 countries, covering all continents (see Table 1). We work
with daily CDS data, while the GDP weights are updated on a quarterly basis –they
are thus invariant during quarter q–. Our GDP-weighted measure is motivated by the
fact that larger countries create higher real and financial spillovers to the rest of the
world. In short, when a relatively large country experiences higher sovereign default risk,
its public finance solvency problems will transmit more strongly throughout the global
economy. Larger countries have the potential to create damaging negative externalities
in financial markets given their high sovereign debt loads and deep international trade
relations. Stress in these countries can then induce a change in investor risk aversion,
with an implied impact on other countries’ sovereign default risk.
Second, the GSRI index in (1) results from a weighted average of the CDS spreads
in a sample of N countries. As a result, it emerges as a single global index, common
to all individual countries in the sample. In order to avoid the mechanical effect of one
country’s risk on itself, we exclude that country from the computation of the global risk
measure. So, we construct the daily global risk measure associated with each country j,
excluding itself from the computation of global risk in the same spirit as Lo´pez-Espinosa,
Moreno, Rubia, and Valderrama (2012). Thus, for the j -th country in the sample, we
can define a country-specific GSRI index representative of the average risk profile in the
remaining countries:
GSRIj,t =
 N∑
i=1,i 6=j
GDPi,t
−1 N∑
i=1,i 6=j
GDPi,t × CDSi,t. (2)
2.2 A Measure of Exposure to Global Sovereign Default Risk
We now introduce the measure of local exposure to global risk, SCRE. Assume that
one has computed the sequence GSRIj,t for a given country j given a sample of daily
observations t = 1, ..., T along Q quarters. Assume that the q-th quarter is formed
by Mq daily observations and let GSRIj,t,(m)m = 1, ...,Mq denote the m-th ordered
observation of the GSRI index at such quarter, noting, for instance, that GSRIj,t,(1) and
GSRIj,t,(Mq) would correspond to the minimum and the maximum daily observation of
the process within the quarter, respectively. For ease of exposition, assume that Mq = 100
and that GSRIj,t,(m) is monotonically increasing such that GSRIj,t,(m) < GSRIj,t,(m+1).
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In this context, the ordered observation GSRIj,t,(m) corresponds exactly to the m-th
empirical quantile of the process. For an arbitrary shortfall probability α, the observation
GSRIj,t,(100(1−α)) defines a risk threshold such that the empirical probability of observing
a realization of the weighted-average global index higher than this level is only 100× α.
Note that GSRIj,t,(100(1−α)) can be seen as the empirical daily Value-at-Risk (VaR)of the
process at the α confidence level, i.e., since the underlying asset is the CDS spread, the
(historical or realized) α VaR level is given by the 1− α percentile in the sample.
Next, given the shortfall probability α and its complement λ = 1 − α, consider the
ordinal set:
Sq(α) =
{
t : GSRIj,t > GSRIj,t,(100λ)
}
(3)
signaling the days within the q-th quarter in which the observed value of the GSRI index
exceeds the 100(1−α) VaR threshold, i.e., the days in which a VaR violation (also known
as a VaR exception in the related literature) occurred given the choice of α. Note that,
by construction, the Sq(α) set is composed of 100× α observations, each one indicating
a particular day within the quarter. Then, given the shortfall probability α, and in the
same spirit as Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2016), we define SCRE
as:
SCREj,q(α) = E (CDSj,t | t ∈ Sq(α)) , (4)
measuring the expected value of the country-specific CDS spread during the days in
which its related global CDS index was greater than the α VaR threshold.
As a result, the SCRE is an expected shortfall-type measure that can be proxied by
the average value of the national CDS spread when the global debt market is in distress,
this event being characterized by the occurrence of VaR exceptions in the global market.
If the macro-financial fundamentals of a given country are such that the country is re-
silient against shocks originated in other economic areas, the SCRE measure should not
greatly differ from its unconditional values. Alternatively, if the local economy is vulner-
able as a consequence of large exposures to other economies, SCRE could considerably
increase during these periods of global distress. Analyzing the empirical drivers of this
variable is the main goal of this paper.
As an illustration of our exposure measure, Figure 1 plots the dynamics of the SCRE
index at the 1% level (alternative significance levels yield the same qualitative results) in
8 countries of our sample coming from the 6 different continents. The implied dynamics
reveal several interesting facts. First, there is wide divergence in SCRE across countries.
Second, the fourth quarter of 2008 is the period in which most countries were exposed
to global risk, coinciding with the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse. Third,
Turkey, Philippines, Peru and Mexico were most affected by this event. Fourth, France,
a key European country, was the least affected by the 2008 crisis but ended up being
the third most exposed to global risk during the 2011-2012 period, coinciding with the
European sovereign debt crisis. Fifth, emerging markets, such as Turkey, Morocco, Peru
and Philippines, exhibit an increase in exposure at the end of the sample (2015). Sixth,
6
  
Australia is the least exposed country: While its exposure increased around 2008, it did
so to a much lower level than most countries.
3 Data Selection
The dataset covers 53 countries across all continents including Europe (27), Americas
(9), Asia (12), Africa (3), and Oceania (2) (Table 1). The sample includes 29 advanced
economies and 24 emerging economies. Data spans from the first quarter of 2006 to the
last quarter of 2015. In some countries or periods, CDS spreads did not exist during our
data-span; in these instances, we drop those observations from the regression analysis.
We use daily CDS spreads collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. In our paper we
focus on the explanatory power of macro-financial factors on the exposure of countries
to global sovereign risk. Thus, we match CDS data with macro-financial data for all
countries. Monthly forecast variables are sourced from Consensus Economics.2 The data
sources for all our variables are shown in Table 2.
The analysis follows a reduced form approach based on economic theory, empirical
relevance, and policy impact, rather than a structural framework defined by the specifi-
cation of a particular pricing model. Since sovereign CDS spreads reflect the risk that the
country experiences a credit default event, the determinants of the sovereign exposure
measure are closely linked to those underlying risks to debt sustainability. The set of
debt sustainability factors include fiscal variables, economic fundamentals driving debt
dynamics, rollover risk indicators, and the scope for contingent liabilities (International
Monetary Fund (2013)). These variables inform our selection of exposure drivers to global
sovereign default risk as we now describe.
Fiscal variables (debt-to-GDP and decit-to-GDP ratios) are key drivers of sovereign
risk. A government is solvent if it is perceived to be able to generate sufficient primary
budget surpluses to repay its outstanding debt. According to IMFs Debt Sustainability
Analysis (DSA), the higher the level of public debt, the higher the probability that fiscal
policy and public debt might become unsustainable. One of the implications in the
theoretical work by Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura (2014) is that less public debt
and strong institutions can help the economy avoid the risk of such self-fullling sovereign
debt crises. Empirically, Heinz and Sun (2014) find that fiscal consolidation effort has
a large effect on CDS spreads. A one percentage point increase in the fiscal deficit
raised CDS spreads by 16 bps during the euro crisis episode, suggesting that, especially
under market duress, markets perception of the fiscal consolidation path has a significant
bearing on CDS spreads. High level of public debt also raises CDS spreads. They find
2Consensus Economics is the world’s leading international economic survey covering estimates for the
principal macroeconomic indicators including GDP growth, inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates,
over 85 countries, as well as commodity prices.
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that the norm CDS spreads for countries with debt exceeding 80 percent of GDP would
be higher by 105 bps during the euro crisis compared to other countries. These results
are supported by the findings in Cottarelli and Jaramillo (2012). Fiscal fundamentals
(primary balances and public debt) are found to have a significant effect on CDS spreads
in advanced economies: An improvement in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio would
reduce spreads while an increase in debt to GDP would raise them.
Besides including fiscal variables in our work, we also explore several dimensions re-
lated to public debt overhang problems, as excessive public debt and higher fiscal decits
may curtail investment and growth. This notion is linked to the fiscal space framework
proposed by Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry and Qureshi (2013), which determines a debt
limit beyond which fiscal solvency concerns trigger expectations of future defaults. Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2010) also point to the 90 percent public debt cutoff and we devote a
subsection to the non-linear effect of different levels of public debt on exposure to global
turmoil. We also address the potential public debt non-linear effect on exposure within
both the Eurozone and the peripheral European countries. Policy changes, such as the
ECB announcement to buy unlimited amount of Eurozone government debt (Draghi
(2012)) are also analyzed in our setting, since this could affect the sensitivity of exposure
public debt levels.
Economic fundamentals matter with regard to sovereign risk and debt dynamics. If
macroeconomic imbalances are not corrected in a timely manner, the materialization of
country-specific risks to sovereign debt sustainability would have adverse implications
not only for the country concerned, but also for countries with similar debt structure and
economic environment. Deteriorating economic fundamentals, reflected in lower GDP
growth, higher inflation, and increasing interest rates, worsen debt dynamics by implying
a rising debt path which is considered a clear sign of unsustainability. It also increases
the horizon needed to stabilize the debt ratio implying heightened uncertainty and higher
debt sustainability risks. Another channel through which fundamentals (GDP growth,
inflation rate and risk-free rates) might impact sovereign exposure to global turmoil is
through financial frictions. Institutional frameworks with poorer fundamentals tend to
display higher information asymmetries across financial markets (Greenwald, Stiglitz, and
Weiss (1984), and Mishkin (1996)), leading to a more uncertain environment for investors
and higher exposure to global financial turmoil, such as global sovereign risk. This
channel is particularly relevant for developing countries as attested during the financial
turmoil generated by the taper tantrum (International Monetary Fund (2014)). Although
market reaction was indiscriminate during the initial bout of volatility in May-June 2013
triggered by the Federal Reserves tapering process, market differentiation occurred during
the subsequent bouts of volatility. Investors focused particularly on emerging markets
with larger external financing needs and macroeconomic imbalances. Our analysis enables
to assess the impact of this channel since our sample covers both developed and developing
countries.
Expected economic growth is particularly relevant for sovereign risk. It is a forward-
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looking variable, much like financial market variables, such as CDS spreads. Arguably
it incorporates valuable information for investors. For instance, countries with weak fis-
cal/external/financial positions could be less exposed to global tail risk if GDP growth
expectations are good as higher growth helps mitigate debt sustainability concerns. Clas-
sical theoretical models, such as Calvo (1988), and more recent ones, such as Nicolini,
Teles, Ayres, and Navarro (2015), imply that some countries can experience higher ten-
sions in sovereign debt markets due to negative agents expectations about their policies
and fundamentals. Baseline expectations on macroeconomic projections for GDP growth,
price stability assumptions, and risk-free rates are incorporated in the DSA benchmark
simulations conducted by the European Commission in their fiscal sustainability assess-
ment of member states (European Commission, 2017).
Rollover risk indicators stemming from the economy-wide net financial position and
external competitiveness also impact sovereign debt sustainability concerns. A country
more open to trade could weather a crisis better, due to the diversication of its exter-
nal sector. In turn, a country with high external debt could suffer more during global
turmoil due to capital outows and to rollover problems (Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and McK-
innon and Pill (1996)). Yet external debt could also lead to growth and a less probable
exposure to global risk if stable foreign funding is allocated to productive investment
projects. Among the external vulnerability indicators with the highest predictive power
for sovereign crises identified by the European Commission’s early warning framework,
are current account balance indicators as well as a country’s net international investment
position (NIIP) are ranked as key determinants of sovereign distress (European Central
Bank (2017)). We include the trade-to-GDP ratio (export plus imports) to proxy open-
ness and the external-debt-to-GDP ratio to capture risks from the external indebtedness
of the economy, including from the net financial position of the government. A higher
external-debt ratio captures greater financing needs from external sources which exposes
the sovereign to rollover risk.
Indicators of contingent liabilities can play a role in sovereign default risk exposure.
The financial crisis has shown that fiscal costs can stem from contingent liabilities related
to weak banks or private sectors indebtedness. Ratings agencies regularly incorporate an
uplift from government support into banks credit rating assessment linked to changes in
sovereign ratings. This captures the extent to which risks to bank creditors are mitigated
by public support through the expectation of public guarantees and the bail-out of sys-
temic banks (Moody’s (2015)). At the same time, government support puts additional
strain on public finances, rising the likelihood of future sovereign defaults. In light of the
adverse sovereign-bank feedback loop, the rating agencies’ methodological approach is
typically based on joint default analysis based on the dependence between the sovereign
capacity to provide support and the bank unsupported creditworthiness. This approach
is examined empirically by the systemic contingent claims analysis (‘Systemic CCA’)
framework which helps quantify the magnitude of general solvency risk and government
contingent liabilities by combining the individual risk-adjusted balance sheets of financial
9
  
institutions and the dependence between them. Sectoral interlinkages are illustrated by
the significant fiscal costs and the materialization of contingent liabilities for governments
triggered during the European sovereign debt crisis linked to the burst of unsustainable
credit-financed booms and asset bubbles.
Excessive credit growth relative to GDP (measured by the credit-to-GDP ratio)
emerges as a key driver to the formation of bubbles in credit and asset prices. Basel
III uses the gap between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend as a guide for
setting countercyclical capital buffers aimed at strengthening banks resilience against the
build-up of systemic vulnerabilities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)).
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos (2013) elaborate a theoretical model where
weak corporate governance frameworks have a negative influence on saving banks by pro-
moting too much credit. Thus, there is over-lending, bubbles and rising non-performing
loans. Borrowers creditworthiness is also included in the set of contingent liabilities indi-
cators used to assess sovereign-debt-related vulnerabilities and risks (European Central
Bank (2017)). Gray, Gross, Paredes, and Sydow (2013) calibrate a global model to cap-
ture interlinkages between sovereign credit spreads, banking system credit risk, corporate
credit risk, economic growth, and credit growth. They show that credit growth acts as a
conduit of crisis propagation of distress in the sovereign, banking and corporate sector.
To capture lending conditions in credit markets, we also include the difference between
the Taylor-implied interest rate and the 3-month rate.3 This latter variable captures how
loose/strict monetary policy is or has been in the past. As emphasized by the literature,
countries with loose monetary policy can also experience over-lending and bubbles (Mad-
daloni and Peydro´ (2011)). The reinforcing effect between monetary policy stance and
credit growth is illustrated by the series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations
(TLTRO II) launched by the ECB in March 2016 to reinforce ECBs accommodative
monetary policy stance and foster new credit.
Finally, we control for liquidity conditions in global money markets. Liquidity risk
can undermine the sovereign’s ability to refinance its maturing debt in funding markets,
increasing the cost of servicing the debt and amplifying debt sustainability concerns.
Fontana and Scheicher (2010) argue that liquidity shortages in money markets prompted
investors’ flight to liquidity behavior, which limited arbitrage across markets and con-
tributed to a rise in sovereign CDS spreads during the European debt sovereign crisis.
To control for global liquidity, we include the US TED spread difference between the 3-
month unsecured inter-bank interest rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate, as a proxy
for global liquidity conditions. Hong, Huang and Wu (2014) show that systemic liquid-
ity risk measured by the TED spread was a major predictor of default risk during the
financial crisis.
3Since different countries -especially emerging ones- may have different inflation targets and natural
real rates, we also calibrated alternative values to the ones originally proposed by Taylor (1993) for these
variables with very similar subsequent results.
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4 Econometric Approach
The goal of the present paper is to explain the country exposure to global tail sovereign
risk in terms of macro-financial fundamentals. In order to uncover potentially significant
relations and derive the associated policy implications, we work in the following panel
data setting with country fixed effects:
SCREj,q(α) = γj(α) + β
′(α)Zj,q + j,q, (5)
where γj(α) is a country specific fixed effect for a given significance level α, controlling
for unobserved heterogeneous country effects. Zj,q is the set of time-varying (quarterly)
macro variables for country j, which act as predictors of exposure to financial risk, and
j,q is a random term with mean zero and assumed to obey standard assumptions.
The expected value that characterizes the SCRE measure is computed as the sample
mean of the country-specific CDS spreads over the days in which the values of the related
GSRI index exceeds the α VaR threshold in a given quarter. Note that this approach
is entirely model-free as it does not build on any parametric assumption. As a result,
it ensures robustness and consistency under fairly general conditions on the (formally
unknown) data generating process that features (SCREj,q(α)). In order to gauge the ro-
bustness of our results, we consider three different statistical significance levels (shortfall
probabilities), namely, 10%, 5% and 1%.
In the estimation, we test for both potential multi-collinearity and endogeneity con-
cerns. Economic growth is highly correlated with expectations of growth (0.70) and
inflation is highly correlated with expectations of inflation (0.94). When applying the
condition index, we find that the largest condition number is 32.31. Following Besley,
Kuh, and Welsch (1980), and given that the condition number is larger than 30, multi-
collinearity is a very serious concern when we include both the actual variables (growth
and inflation) and the expectations of their future values. Thus, we do not include these
variables and their expectations jointly in our regressions. Given that expectations in-
clude information of both current and expected future events, we estimate our model
with GDP growth expectations as a driver. We now explain how we use inflation (its
first lag) as an instrument for the interest rate in our regressions (the first lag of expected
inflation is also used as an instrument in some of the robustness exercises).
Preliminary analyses suggested that the interest rate variable could lead to endogene-
ity problems in our analysis. Consequently, we estimate model (5) using instrumental
variable 2SLS regressions, where we instrument the interest rate with lagged inflation.
The correlation between the interest rate and the first lag of inflation is quite high (62%)
and there is also a pass-through of past inflation to the current interest rate given both
the inflation persistence and the relation between inflation and the interest rate via Fisher
effect and standard monetary policies, such as inflation targeting. Importantly, the in-
flation lag should not be correlated with the error term in the main equation, given
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that the right hand side variables (such as expected growth or monetary policy stance,
among others) should capture information on past inflation, thus yielding an error term
orthogonal to past inflation.
Regarding the statistical validity of our instrumental variables approach, we report at
the bottom of each table the p-values associated with two tests. We report the p-values
associated with testing whether the interest rate is exogenous (under header “Exogeneity”
in the tables) following the method in Wu (1974) and Hausman (1978). We also show
the p-values associated with testing whether the instruments are weak (under header
“Instrument” in the tables), following Stock and Yogo (2005). p-values across the tables
reported in the paper reveal rejections that the interest rate is exogenous (always at the
5% significance level and often at the 1%), and rejections that lagged inflation is a weak
instrument for the interest rate (always at the 1% significance level). We thus find that
the first lag of inflation is a valid instrument for the interest rate. We also found that
results are robust to the inclusion of alternative valid instruments (see online Appendix).
In particular, we have found that using the lag of expected inflation also delivers very
similar results. Moreover, the combination of the following two or three instruments
for the interest rate also delivered very similar results: Lagged interest rate and lagged
inflation; lagged interest rate and lagged expected inflation; lagged interest rate, lagged
inflation and lagged output growth.
In the next section we report the main paper results, a series of robustness exercises
and discuss the associated policy implications.
5 Results
We organize our results section as follows. First, we show the benchmark results with our
fixed effects panel regressions for the different significance levels in our exposure variable
and the CDS mean/median spreads. In this way, we try to uncover differences in terms
of pricing: Do macro-finance variables influence CDS spreads, exposure or both? Second,
we refine our results based on alternative debt-to-GDP thresholds. Third, we study the
contribution of the Eurozone (peripheral countries) problems and policy actions to the
sensitivity of our exposure measure to fiscal variables. Finally, we report a series of
robustness exercises.
5.1 Baseline Results
The first three columns of Table 3 show the parameter estimates of our panel regressions
with country fixed-effects for our exposure variable and for three different significance
levels (10, 5 and 1% in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively). We obtain robust errors
corrected for clustering at the quarter (time) dimension (similar results were obtained
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clustering at the country dimension). Results are similar across significance levels. We
find the following statistically significant effects: Countries with lower expectations of
GDP growth, higher interest rates (instrumented with lagged inflation), a higher debt-
to-GDP ratio, lax monetary policy, low trade-to-GDP ratio and high credit-to-GDP ratio
are significantly more exposed to global sovereign risk. These results highlight the overall
importance of high productivity, sound fiscal policy and financial stability, and capture
the main message of the paper: Good macro-financial policies and fundamentals act as
insulators against global sovereign debt stress. With respect to previous related empirical
studies (Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013) and Beirne and Fratzscher (2013)),
our paper underscores the role of low GDP growth expectations, lax monetary policy
and high credit-to-GDP as important drivers of high sovereign debt exposure.
The last two columns ((4) and (5), respectively) of Table 3 show the results with
the mean and median of the CDS values over the quarter as left-hand side variables,
respectively. While results are similar to those of the exposure variables in terms of
coefficient signs, a key difference emerges. It is often the case that the size of the exposure
regression coefficients is higher than in mean/median CDS regressions. While this is
expected to a certain extent –the exposure measures tend to include the worst realizations
of the sovereign CDS spreads– the result is economically significant, as it implies that the
macro prices of risk associated with many variables are higher in turbulent than normal
times. Hence the policy implications for policy makers are especially relevant for stressful
times in global sovereign markets.
The literature on sovereign credit pricing has emphasized the importance of liquid-
ity in driving both cross-country and time series variations. Indeed some papers high-
light flight-to-liquidity patterns in sovereign debt markets (Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz
(2009)). Notice, however, that our analysis substantially differs from these studies, as we
try to explain exposure to global sovereign turmoil. In Table 3 -and subsequent tables-
we control for the US TED spread (the difference between the 3-month interbank rate
and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate), as a proxy for the ease of credit in a key financial
market reflecting global liquidity conditions. Results for this variable are marginally sig-
nificant, implying a negative relation between this spread and sovereign exposure. While
this result runs counter to intuition, we note two things. First, the US TED spread mea-
sures liquidity in the US and may not capture local financial conditions in many of the
countries in our sample. Second, the European debt crisis started to grow at a time when
the TED spread was decreasing. Indeed, we have performed several unreported exercises
showing that while American countries exposure increased with the TED spread, the
opposite was the case for Eurozone countries. In the robustness exercise, we go back to
illustrate this point.4
4The online Appendix shows that results are robust to the inclusion of the macro-finance drivers with
one lag instead of contemporaneous values.
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5.2 Debt Threshold Levels
One of the most important variables discussed in policy and academic circles is the level
of debt-to-GDP and its relation with the capacity to grow. Indeed, Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010) ignited an important debate by pointing at a 90% debt over GDP threshold level
–via descriptive analysis– over which GDP growth levels begin to suffer. However, in a
recent paper, Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014) have challenged their results. Our analysis
already showed the significant predictive power of debt-to-GDP on exposure. We can
shed some additional light on the issue but from a completely different perspective. We
can check whether exposure of countries to global sovereign risk is affected by alternative
debt-to-GDP thresholds.
Table 4 shows the results of panel regressions allowing for potential non-linear effects
and split the contribution of the debt-to-GDP on exposure by countries/quarters with a
debt-to-GDP ratio lower/higher than 90% (ie., we multiply the debt-to-GDP observations
by two dummies, adopting values of one whenever debt-to-GDP is lower/higher than
90%). Table 4 shows these results for the alternative exposure confidence levels and the
mean (median) CDS spreads. Baseline results are unaltered, with both debt-to-GDP
variables being statistically significant. The sensitivity of CDS spreads to debt-to-GDP
is higher for high debt-to-GDP countries.
We further investigate the debt non-linearities and endogenously estimate the thresh-
olds themselves. We consider the possibility that the effect of debt changes in country
exposure may non-linearly depend on the level of debt over GDP. Thresholds have been
estimated endogenously from data, as in the threshold model literature, among others,
by Tong (1983), Tong (1990), Chan (1993), Hansen (1999), Hansen (2000) and Caner and
Hansen (2004). The two thresholds can be inferred similarly using sequential estimation
as in the change-point literature; see Hansen (1999) for details. Our experiment shows
that the best fitting model includes two thresholds, which are 106.59% and 157.44%
The results in Table 5 are very interesting.5 In this panel regression, the only segment
of debt-to-GDP which remains statistically significant is that above 156.04%, with an
economic value well above the other two segments. This points at an important role for
fiscal non-linear effects on exposure variables. Furthermore, the deficit-to-GDP variable
now becomes statistically significant, with higher deficit levels leading to higher sovereign
exposure.
5In Table 5, low debt-GDP is associated with countries with less than 106.59% debt-to-GDP, int debt-
GDP is for countries between 106.59 and 157.44% debt-to-GDP, while high debt-GDP is for countries
above 157.44% debt-to-GDP. Endogenous thresholds are the same across regressions.
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5.3 Eurozone Debt Crisis
Our sample includes the European sovereign debt crisis –a fallout of the 2008 global
financial crisis–, affecting many Eurozone countries, especially those often called periph-
erals (Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece). At the same time, we recognize the
potential importance of the July 26, 2012 speech by European Central Bank President,
Mario Draghi, stressing the eagerness of the ECB to buy unlimited amounts of all Euro-
zone countries public debt and to save the euro. We now study the effects of this policy
action on the exposure of peripheral countries to global sovereign tail risk.
In our reported exercise, we control for the effects of this promised policy action by
adding both a dummy for Eurozone peripheral countries in the pre-2012:Q4 period and an
interaction term between the public-debt-to GDP ratio and this dummy. In this way, we
account for the potential different sensitivity of peripheral countries to public debt levels
before and after the policy action. Results are reported in Table 6. Even accounting
for the fact that peripherals’ fundamentals were not good, non-linear effects emerge
as important. The dummy on the interaction between peripherals and pre-2012:Q4 is
positive and large, pointing at an extra exposure of peripherals to global sovereign tail
risk before Draghi’s July 2012 speech. Interestingly, results also show a stark decrease in
terms of exposure sensitivity to public debt levels for peripheral countries since the 4th
quarter of 2012 (note that the positive interaction term is for the pre-2012:Q4 quarter).
Thus, this policy action had an important positive and differential effect for Eurozone
peripheral countries, which saw their exposure substantially reduced.
5.4 Robustness Exercises
We carefully designed our methodology in the construction of the global measure to
exclude mechanical effects from local to global credit risk. Nevertheless, it could be
argued that the home country influences our global measure indirectly, through contagion
to other countries. During our sample period, and as mentioned in previous subsections,
some countries have been key originators of global risk. In particular, starting in 2010,
the peripheral countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) were instrumental to
increase European and global risk. To control for this potential effect and as a robustness
analysis, we drop these countries from our estimation, but not from the computation of
the global sovereign risk measure.
Table 7 excludes the five peripheral countries in the regression analysis. Three main
findings are worth highlighting. First, dropping these countries result in a clear improve-
ment in the fit of the model, with much higher R2s, sometimes increasing to 52%. This
is probably due to the fact that we removed some of the countries with higher expo-
sure and thus more difficult to fit (see also Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013)).
Second, most of the previous results still hold under these specifications, but two new
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significant coefficients emerge. First, higher fiscal deficits significantly increase exposure
to global tail risk. Second, removing the peripheral countries, higher external debt-to-
GDP reduces exposure to global sovereign risk. So, for the remaining countries, external
debt seems to have supported productive investment and economic growth, potentially
enhancing their fiscal position. In turn, the TED spread is no longer significant when we
exclude the peripherals, pointing at a key negative relation between peripherals and the
TED spread driving the negative coefficient in the benchmark estimation.
As a last reported analysis, we perform an out-of-sample exercise based on our baseline
specification. We estimate the model from 2006:Q1 to 2011:Q4. Based on the parameters
estimated in this subsample and on the post-2012 right-hand side variables, we construct
the out-of-sample predicted values and compare them with the post-2012 exposure values.
Figure 2 plots these predicted values against the actual values for the regressions with
exposure at the 1% confidence level. Our benchmark linear model predicts the exposure
quite well for prices from 0 to 1,000, with errors being significant when the CDS price is
above 5,000. However, we only have seven observations, after 2011:Q4 above this value (2
for Argentina and 5 for Greece). We also report in the graph the observations with large
errors. For exposure at the 10%, the average of residuals is -35.76, -30.47 for exposure
at 5%, -31.99 for exposure at 1%, -0.60 when we use the average CDS and 2.93 when
median CDS is used. Overall, forecast errors are not statistically significantly different
from zero.
6 Conclusions, Policy Implications
We study the exposure of national sovereign debt markets to global sovereign distress
using a broad sample of advanced and emerging economies. The analysis explores a
particularly relevant direction of international financial interdependence: From global
to country risk in sovereign debt markets. National sovereign risk, captured by shifts
to CDS spreads is in turn related to country macro-financial variables. Our battery
of regressions shows that good macro fundamentals are key to understand why some
countries are more affected by global risk than others. Thus, having good fundamentals
is just not something good in itself but happens to be key in order to insulate countries
from global turbulence episodes.
Our careful, if straightforward, analysis identified exposure to global sovereign risk.
We first constructed a measure of global sovereign risk and then selected the country-
sovereign risk observations associated with global distress over each quarter. We also
removed the effect of a given country on global sovereign risk in order to avoid mechan-
ical transmission from country sovereign risk. To shed additional insights on sovereign
risk inter-dependences, we further refined our analysis along some dimensions, such as
exploring non-linearities based on debt-to-GDP levels and focusing on specific countries
belonging to the Eurozone. Across exercises, these regressions basically reinforced the
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baseline results. Interestingly, our exercises illustrated the positive impact that mone-
tary policy makers had in the embattled Eurozone fiscal sectors. Indeed, we showed that
sovereign debt exposure significantly and substantially decreased in these countries when
the ECB announced they were going to be accommodative and to buy unlimited levels
of sovereign debt.
In times of distress money flees problematic countries. This is the main tenet of the
“flight to quality” literature (see Calvo (2005)). Our paper confirms this point and reveals
a crucial amplification channel through national sovereign exposure to global tail risk.
While the quantification of the implied borrowing costs under global tail risk is outside the
scope of the paper, our results clearly show that poor fundamentals exacerbate sovereign
distress by increasing the cost of insurance against credit risk.
These results have important policy implications at both the country and the multi-
national level. At the country level, fiscal, monetary and regulatory authorities should
focus on good fundamentals not only to improve the current economic environment, but
because these act as an insurance against global turmoil in sovereign debt markets. On
the cross-sectoral dimension, given the interplay of risks across the sovereign, banking,
and corporate sectors typically revealed in times of stress,6 easing sovereign risk can also
reduce the risk of spillovers to the financial sector and to the broader economy. On
the time dimension, our results suggest that building economic buffers matter most in
times of global distress. This points at the benefits of a framework for countercyclical
macroeconomic policy which takes into account the global business cycle.
Our work also has implications for the work of international financial institutions
(IFIs), aimed at preventing global financial crises. IFIs provide strong support for policies
aiming at enhancing macro-financial stability. Our results provide support to the early
warning exercise conducted by the IMF to strengthen surveillance of cross-sectoral and
cross-border externalities triggered by economic, financial, and fiscal risks. As macro
fundamentals grow more stable across countries, the likelihood that a crisis-like scenario
materializes clearly diminishes. Our work can be used to complement the recent proposal
formulated by Van Riet (2017) at the European Systemic Risk Board to encourage the
issuance of national GDP-linked bonds against sovereign credit risk in the Eurozone.
An alternative interesting route of analysis would be to study the contribution of
particular countries to global sovereign crises.7 It may be that a country has been es-
pecially exposed to the crisis even if it has not contributed to the crisis at all. While
6See Gray, Gross, Paredes, and Sydow (2013) for an integrated macroeconomic systemic risk frame-
work that draws on the advantages of forward-looking contingent claims analysis (CCA) risk indicators
for the banking systems in each country, forward-looking CCA risk indicators for sovereigns, and a
GVAR model to combine the banking, the sovereign, and the macro sphere for 15 European countries
and the United States.
7Our exposure approach can be seen as complementary to the contribution approach, also present
in the systemic risk literature, and developed in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and Lo´pez-Espinosa,
Moreno, Rubia, and Valderrama (2012).
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disentangling exposure and contribution in sovereign debt markets remains a challenge
from both conceptual and technical viewpoints, it definitely deserves further research.
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Table 1: List of countries in the sample
Africa Asia America Europe Oceania
Egypt China Argentina Austria Australia
Morocco Hong-Kong Brazil Belgium New Zealand
South Africa Indonesia Canada Croatia
Israel Chile Czech Republic
Japan Mexico Denmark
Malaysia Colombia Estonia
Pakistan United States Finland
Philippines Venezuela France
South Korea Peru´ Germany
Saudi Arabia Greece
Thailand Hungary
Turkey Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Lithuania
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
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Table 2: Variables, Abbreviations and Datasources
Variable Abbreviation Source
Credit Default Swap CDS Thomson Reuters Datastream
3-month Sovereign Interest Rate int-rate World Economic Outlook
GDP Growth Expectation (1-year) E(growth) Consensus Economics Forecasts
CPI Inflation Expectation (1-year) E(growth) Consensus Economics Forecasts
Taylor rule - 3-month Interest Rate MP stance World Economic Outlook
Government Debt to GDP debt-gdp World Economic Outlook
Government Deficit to GDP def-gdp World Economic Outlook
External Debt to GDP ext-gdp World Economic Outlook
Exports + Imports to GDP trade-gdp World Economic Outlook
Credit to GDP credit-gdp International Financial Statistics,
Haver Analytics
3 month interbank rate - 3 month
US T-Bill rate
ted Bloomberg
This table shows variables used in our estimation exercises together with the abbreviations used in the
forthcoming tables and the data sources.
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Table 3: Benchmark Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
int-rate 134.94*** 135.41*** 136.21*** 119.69*** 128.35***
(3.42) (3.43) (3.45) (3.54) (3.17)
E(growth) -149.56*** -149.26*** -148.44*** -141.25*** -148.39***
(-4.08) (-4.03) (-3.96) (-4.13) (-4.13)
MP stance 38.52** 38.64** 38.22** 32.95** 38.39**
(2.26) (2.27) (2.25) (2.17) (2.19)
debt-gdp 8.82*** 8.98*** 9.20*** 8.31*** 7.93***
(4.82) (4.78) (4.69) (4.37) (4.70)
def-gdp -8.40 -8.35 -8.40 -11.57* -11.11*
(-1.21) (-1.17) (-1.15) (-1.82) (-1.71)
ext-gdp -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.52 0.46
(-0.05) (-0.00) (-0.02) (0.49) (0.43)
trade-gdp -1.48* -1.51* -1.53* -1.23 -1.40*
(-1.85) (-1.90) (-1.93) (-1.61) (-1.76)
ted -148.22* -142.06* -140.01* -144.85** -164.65**
(-1.85) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-2.12) (-2.02)
credit-gdp 5.08*** 5.11*** 5.24*** 4.69*** 4.36***
(3.12) (3.10) (3.05) (2.81) (2.85)
Observations 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001
R-squared 0.407 0.403 0.400 0.381 0.398
Exogeneity 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.024
Instrument 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table shows the IV 2SLS estimates of our econometric model (see equation (5) in the text) with
quarterly data (from 2006:Q1 to 2015:Q4) and country-fixed effects (the associated t-statistics appear
in parentheses). Lagged CPI inflation is used as instrument for the 3-month interest rate. Results
in columns (1), (2) and (3) are those associated with exposure at the 10, 5 and 1% confidence level,
respectively. (4) and (5) are results with the mean and median of the CDS values. Three, two and
one star(s) imply statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% confidence level. Robust standard errors
(corrected by time/quarter clustering) are employed.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates: Threshold on 90% of Debt-To-GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
int-rate 134.22*** 134.70*** 135.49*** 118.99*** 127.67***
(3.40) (3.41) (3.43) (3.52) (3.15)
E(growth) -151.73*** -151.41*** -150.61*** -143.33*** -150.41***
(-4.08) (-4.03) (-3.96) (-4.13) (-4.13)
MP stance 38.34** 38.47** 38.05** 32.78** 38.23**
(2.25) (2.26) (2.24) (2.17) (2.19)
low debt-gdp 7.30*** 7.48*** 7.68*** 6.85*** 6.51***
(3.39) (3.39) (3.36) (3.21) (3.26)
high debt-gdp 8.67*** 8.84*** 9.06*** 8.17*** 7.80***
(4.68) (4.65) (4.56) (4.27) (4.56)
def-gdp -7.78 -7.74 -7.79 -10.98* -10.54*
(-1.15) (-1.11) (-1.09) (-1.77) (-1.66)
ext-gdp 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.64 0.57
(0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.59) (0.52)
trade-gdp -1.33* -1.36* -1.39* -1.09 -1.26
(-1.67) (-1.71) (-1.74) (-1.42) (-1.59)
ted -148.95* -142.78* -140.74* -145.55** -165.33**
(-1.86) (-1.76) (-1.74) (-2.13) (-2.03)
credit-gdp 4.96*** 4.99*** 5.12*** 4.57*** 4.25***
(3.01) (3.00) (2.95) (2.73) (2.76)
Observations 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001
R-squared 0.408 0.404 0.401 0.382 0.399
Exogeneity 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.025
Instrument 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table shows the IV 2SLS estimates of our econometric model (see equation (5) in the text) with
quarterly data (from 2006:Q1 to 2015:Q4) and country-fixed effects (the associated t-statistics appear in
parentheses). Lagged CPI inflation is used as instrument for the 3-month interest rate. The debt/GDP
threshold applied is 90%. Results in columns (1), (2) and (3) are those associated with exposure at the
10, 5 and 1% confidence level, respectively. (4) and (5) are results with the mean and median of the
CDS values. Three, two and one star(s) imply statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% confidence
level. Robust standard errors (corrected by time/quarter clustering) are employed.
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates: Endogenous Thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
int-rate 123.38*** 123.75*** 124.33*** 107.65*** 117.26***
(3.14) (3.16) (3.17) (3.22) (2.91)
E(growth) -164.32*** -164.16*** -163.66*** -156.80*** -162.62***
(-4.34) (-4.28) (-4.22) (-4.47) (-4.41)
MP stance 42.97** 43.12** 42.81** 37.76** 42.72**
(2.56) (2.57) (2.56) (2.54) (2.48)
low debt-gdp -0.49 -0.40 -0.36 -1.47 -1.03
(-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.70) (-0.48)
int debt-gdp 1.38 1.49 1.52 0.26 0.70
(0.65) (0.68) (0.69) (0.13) (0.34)
high debt-gdp 16.10*** 16.30*** 16.69*** 16.31*** 15.04***
(4.90) (4.85) (4.75) (4.32) (4.75)
def-gdp 6.48* 6.63* 6.89* 4.38 3.30
(1.69) (1.69) (1.72) (1.28) (0.94)
ext-gdp -0.22 -0.18 -0.20 0.32 0.30
(-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.19) (0.35) (0.32)
trade-gdp -0.81 -0.83 -0.84 -0.52 -0.75
(-1.02) (-1.05) (-1.07) (-0.67) (-0.95)
ted -150.51* -144.43* -142.44* -146.92** -166.77**
(-1.83) (-1.74) (-1.71) (-2.10) (-2.00)
credit-gdp 0.11 0.11 0.13 -0.63 -0.46
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (-0.42) (-0.28)
Observations 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001
R-squared 0.468 0.464 0.460 0.451 0.460
Exogeneity 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.010
Instrument 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table shows the IV 2SLS estimates of our econometric model (see equation (5) in the text) with
quarterly data (from 2006:Q1 to 2015:Q4) and country-fixed effects (the associated t-statistics appear
in parentheses). Lagged CPI inflation is used as instrument for the 3-month interest rate. Estimation
considering the optimally selected endogenous two debt-to-GDP threshold levels (106.59% and 157.44%).
Results in columns (1), (2) and (3) are those associated with exposure at the 10, 5 and 1% confidence
level, respectively. (4) and (5) are results with the mean and median of the CDS values. Three, two and
one star(s) imply statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% confidence level. Robust standard errors
(corrected by time/quarter clustering) are employed.
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates: Peripheral Dummies Previous to 2012:Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
int-rate 129.74*** 130.23*** 130.79*** 114.34*** 124.18***
(3.31) (3.32) (3.34) (3.43) (3.08)
p-D 882.63*** 880.85*** 917.61*** 903.72*** 730.19***
(3.49) (3.38) (3.42) (3.06) (2.80)
E(growth) -147.17*** -146.88*** -145.94*** -138.79*** -146.49***
(-4.28) (-4.22) (-4.16) (-4.32) (-4.27)
MP stance 39.63** 39.75** 39.37** 34.07** 39.38**
(2.33) (2.34) (2.32) (2.25) (2.25)
debt-gdp 3.84*** 3.99*** 4.10*** 3.33** 3.24**
(2.63) (2.70) (2.75) (2.34) (2.22)
debt-gdp*p-D 21.37*** 21.36*** 22.05*** 21.62*** 18.86***
(5.90) (5.80) (5.77) (4.98) (5.04)
def-gdp -13.23* -13.16* -13.45* -16.55** -14.96**
(-1.83) (-1.76) (-1.77) (-2.46) (-2.20)
ext-gdp -1.10 -1.06 -1.11 -0.54 -0.46
(-1.05) (-0.99) (-1.01) (-0.54) (-0.45)
trade-gdp -1.52* -1.54* -1.58** -1.28* -1.39*
(-1.88) (-1.93) (-1.98) (-1.68) (-1.74)
ted -164.34** -158.20* -156.54* -161.01** -179.62**
(-2.01) (-1.91) (-1.88) (-2.30) (-2.17)
credit-gdp 5.55*** 5.59*** 5.71*** 5.14*** 4.86***
(3.12) (3.11) (3.08) (2.75) (2.82)
Observations 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001 2,001
R-squared 0.436 0.431 0.428 0.410 0.421
Exogeneity 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.023
Instrument 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table shows the IV 2SLS estimates of our econometric model (see equation (5) in the text) with
quarterly data (from 2006:Q1 to 2015:Q4) and country-fixed effects (the associated t-statistics appear
in parentheses). Lagged CPI inflation is used as instrument for the 3-month interest rate. Estimation
includes one dummy for Eurozone peripheral countries (Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Greece) during
the pre-2012:Q4 quarters (p-D) and an interaction term between government debt-to-GDP ratio and
the Eurozone peripheral countries dummy during the pre-2012:Q4 quarters (debt-GDP*p-D). Results
in columns (1), (2) and (3) are those associated with exposure at the 10, 5 and 1% confidence level,
respectively. (4) and (5) are results with the mean and median of the CDS values. Three, two and
one star(s) imply statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% confidence level. Robust standard errors
(corrected by time/quarter clustering) are employed.
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates: Without Peripherals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
int-rate 123.97*** 124.33*** 124.08*** 107.55*** 120.22***
(3.19) (3.21) (3.21) (3.29) (3.02)
E(growth) -110.88*** -112.10*** -113.14*** -98.72*** -104.98***
(-3.92) (-3.96) (-4.00) (-3.71) (-3.64)
MP stance 42.39** 42.58** 42.31** 37.05** 42.32**
(2.28) (2.29) (2.29) (2.24) (2.22)
debt-gdp 4.54*** 4.68*** 4.66*** 4.03*** 4.31***
(4.45) (4.46) (4.45) (4.71) (4.37)
def-gdp 5.89* 6.09* 6.03* 4.57* 4.27
(1.90) (1.92) (1.91) (1.72) (1.49)
ext-gdp -2.37*** -2.38*** -2.37*** -2.02*** -2.21***
(-3.33) (-3.35) (-3.34) (-3.41) (-3.05)
trade-gdp -1.58* -1.60* -1.62* -1.35* -1.49*
(-1.86) (-1.89) (-1.93) (-1.71) (-1.76)
ted -129.71 -121.76 -118.84 -125.55* -149.27*
(-1.47) (-1.36) (-1.32) (-1.66) (-1.67)
credit-gdp 2.79*** 2.84*** 2.79*** 2.35*** 2.59***
(2.97) (3.02) (3.01) (3.10) (2.82)
Observations 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806
R-squared 0.514 0.516 0.520 0.528 0.487
Exogeneity 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.008
Instrument 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table shows the IV 2SLS estimates of our econometric model (see equation (5) in the text) with
quarterly data (from 2006:Q1 to 2015:Q4) and country-fixed effects (the associated t-statistics appear in
parentheses). Lagged CPI inflation is used as instrument for the 3-month interest rate. Five peripheral
countries (Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece) are excluded from the sample. Results in columns
(1), (2) and (3) are those associated with exposure at the 10, 5 and 1% confidence level, respectively.
(4) and (5) are results with the mean and median of the CDS values. Three, two and one star(s)
imply statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% confidence level. Robust standard errors (corrected by
time/quarter clustering) are employed.
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Highlights 
We provide a new measure of sovereign country risk exposure to global 
sovereign tail risk based on sovereign CDS spreads.  
We estimate the drivers of sovereign exposure with data from 53 countries. 
High expectations of GDP growth and low debt-to-GDP reduce sovereign 
exposure.  
Lax monetary policy stance and high credit-to-GDP growth increase sovereign 
exposure. 
Exposure sensitivity to fiscal leverage is shown to increase non-linearly with 
public debt and to decrease with the European Central Bank sovereign debt 
programs. 
 
